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ABSTRACT

The early decades of the 21st Century may well become known in the
annals of intellectual property development as the period when
"everything old is new again." There is one ancient doctrine that has
not yet enjoyed a similar renaissance, despite its clear application to
today's new, global, digital economy. It is the old (and currently
discredited) view that trademarks and other commercial symbols are
universal in nature. First given credence in early US cases regarding
the importation of grey market, or parallel imports, the doctrine of
universality was gradually replaced by a view of trademarks as
creatures of nation states-pure territorial objects. Such limited view
served trade protectionist goals which have been rejected in today's
global environment of comparative free trade. This article examines
the newly evolving nature of trademarks as "unitorrial" marks in
today's global, digital marketplace. It contends that this new quasiuniversal, quasi-territorial nature demands a re-examination of
domestic and international trademark law, including the treatment of
famous marks, domain names, geographic indications and grey market
imports, and the determination of international fora for enforcement.
The article concludes by suggesting areas where changes in treatment
must be examined in light of this new "unitorrial" trademark.
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In the early days of my law practice, I occasionally was required to consider
whether an advertised brand of a product such as milk, that commanded a
higher retail price than an unadvertised brand of the identical product was
a good of "like grade and quality ......
A straightforward application of
Juliet's observations about roses provides us with an easy answer, but I
often wondered whether trademark lawyers or economists might have a
different view.
Justice John Paul Stevens 1

The early decades of the twenty-first century may well become known in the
annals of intellectual property development as the period when "everything old is
new again."2 Despite the advances in technology and global trade, 3 legal protection
seems to be moving backwards. Piracy is as much as global trade issue as it was in
the 1800's when foreign authors, desperate to protect their works from international
piracy convened the first international conference in copyright protection. 4 Scholars
and judges have questioned the desirability of copyright protection with as much
vigor as Lord Thomas Macaulay when he railed against the "evils" of copyright

* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School.

J.D. Cornell Law School. The author
would like to thank Justice Stevens for the inspiration for this article. His comments about
Banbury Tarts in Chicago led me to wonder whether those early English bakers would have had a
cause of action against the "colonialists" usurpation of their renowned source designator. I would
also like to thank Karen Long, Ted Field, Karl Maersch, and Brian McGraw who assisted in some of
the research supporting this article.
I
Justice John Paul Stevens, Section 43(A) of the Shakespeare Cannon of Statutory
Construction: The Beverly W. PattishallInauguralLecture in TrademarkLaw, 1 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 179, 188-89 (2002).
2 An age-old clich6 that continues to have relevance in the Global Digital Age.
3 See generally Doris Estelle Long, "Globalization':A Future Trend or a Satisfying Mirage
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y _
(2002) (forthcoming) (discussing the economic and technological trends
that underlie current economic globalization); DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREW, ET AL., GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 29 (1999) (discussing the various political,
economic and financial developments that underlie and represent present globalization); JAMES H.
MITTELMAN, THE GLOBALIZATION SYNDROME:
TRANSFORMATION AND RESISTANCE (2000)
(discussing various economic and political developments that underlie present globalization). For a
popular press exploration of economic globalization, including its technological changes, see THOMAS
L. FRIEDMAN, LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 29 (1st Anchor Books ed. 2000) (discussing the economic,
political and technological changes represented by current globalization).
4 This international conference eventually led to the establishment of the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. See generally SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 46 (1987) (discussing the history of
the Berne Convention including the early concerns of authors over lack of international protection
for their works).
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protection in his famous speech before the House of Lords in 1841. 5 U.S. courts
appear to have resurrected the discredited doctrine of election in an effort to restrict
6
the protections available for multi-use intellectual property.
There is one ancient doctrine, however, that has not yet enjoyed a similar
renaissance, despite its clear application to today's new, global, digital economy. It is
the old (and currently discredited) view that trademarks and other commercial
symbols 7 are universal in nature. First given credence in early U.S. cases regarding
the importation of grey market,8 or parallel imports, 9 the doctrine of universality was
gradually replaced by a view of trademarks as creatures of nation states-pure
territorial objects. Such limited view served trade protectionist goals which have
been rejected in today's global environment of comparative free trade.10 I do not
mean to suggest that commercial symbols such as Coca-Colau,

CNN*, MTV* or

Mickey Mouse® are "universal" in the incompletely reasoned sense of nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century scholars.
I do mean, however, that the old ideas of
territoriality and universality must be reconfigured to reflect the reality of these
symbols and their changed nature in the twenty-first century global markets.
This Article examines the newly evolving nature of trademarks as "unitorrial"
marks in today's global, digital marketplace. It contends that this new quasiuniversal, quasi-territorial nature demands a reexamination of domestic and
international trademark law, including the treatment of famous marks, domain
names, geographic indications and grey market imports, and the determination of
international fora for enforcement.
Part I of this Article briefly explores the
transformation in consumer authentication functions of trademarks in the latter
, Thomas Macaulay, The First Speech on Copyright (Feb. 5, 1841), in MACAULAY'S SPEECHES
ON COPYRIGHT AND LINCOLN'S ADDRESS AT THE COOPER UNION 18, 23 (Charles Robert Gaston ed.

1914) (describing copyright as an "evil that ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the
purpose of securing the good" which he defined as a "supply of good books").
(3 See, e.g., Doris Estelle Long, First, Lets Kill All the Intellectual Property Lawy--.:
Musings on the Decline and Fall of the Intellectual PropertyEmpire, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 851,
881 (2001) (discussing the apparent resurrection of the doctrine of election and the potential
harmful results on intellectual property owners and users).
7I am using the term "trademarks" in its broad, non-technical sense to refer to any term,

phrase, device, symbol, logo or sign that serves to distinguish one undertaking's goods and/or
services from those of another. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining a trademark as "any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.., to identify and distinguish, his or her
goods"); Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Art. 15, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS] (defining trademarks as
"any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one
undertaking from those of other undertakings").
8 "Grey market" goods (also referred to as "parallel imports") are products which are
legitimately manufactured in one country, but are being imported into another country without the
authorization of the trademark owner of the country of importation. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988) (defining a "grey market" good under U.S. law as "a foreign
manufactured good, bearing a valid United States trademark, that is imported without the consent
of the United States trademark holder"). They should be distinguished from "counterfeit goods"
which are trademarked goods whose manufacture was not authorized by law in the country of
manufacture.
See, e.g, Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 17, 22 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (allowing the
importation of grey market spring water based on the universal nature of trademark rights); see
also discussion infra Part II.
,0 See discussion infra Part III.
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decades of the twentieth century. Part II examines the growth and foundations of
early universalist treatment for international marks.
Part 111 examines the
subsequent emergence of the doctrine of territoriality and its implications for the
international protection of marks. Parts IV and V examine the errors behind postterritorial treatment of trademarks and explain why universality must be reexamined, and Part VI explores what the unitorrial nature of current trademarks
and other source authenticators means for future protection of trademarked goods in
international commerce. The Article concludes by suggesting areas where changes in
treatment must be examined in light of this new "unitorrial" trademark.

I. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF "PROPERTIZED" TRADEMARKS
As Justice Stevens so aptly demonstrated in his speech, "Section 43(a) of the
Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction," given as The Beverly W. Pattishall
Inaugural Lecture in Trademark Law at the John Marshall Law School, marks bring
certain presumptions to consumers about the quality and nature of the goods and
services they represent. In addressing the age-old dispute about the proper source
designator for the Shakespeare Canon-William Shakepeare or Edward De Vere, the
seventeenth Earl of Oxford-Justice Stevens noted that resolution of who is the
author of the canon might have a direct impact on our presumptions regarding the
value of the written work. Would we enjoy a work by De Vere with the same
pleasure we experience when reading one by William Shakespeare? "I suppose Juliet
would say that the same presumption would prevail, but it is at least possible that
more knowledge about the author might lessen . . . that presumption."11 Because of
the critical importance of source designators, and their invaluable role as quality
communicators for consumers, disputes over the scope of protection to be afforded
these authenticators continue to be exceptionally hard-fought.
Trademarks have undergone a profound transformation in the latter half of the
twentieth century. With the enactment in the United States in 1995 of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, 12 trademarks were transformed from creatures whose
protection was based on protecting the public from consumer confusion, 13 to "pure"
I Stevens, supra note 1, at 188.
12 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000), provides
civil remedies to prohibit the unauthorized use in commerce of a "famous and distinctive" mark
which "causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." § 1125(c). It provides for such relief
regardless of whether the use in question causes a likelihood of confusion. § 1127 (defining
"dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of ... competition between the owner of the famous
mark and the other parties; or ... likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception").
13
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in full the ongoing debate regarding the
"property" versus "public interest" nature of trademark rights, although such debate undeniably has
a direct impact on the perceived nature of trademarks as creatures of territorial invention. Courts
have long recognized the "property" nature of trademark rights. As early as 1879, the Supreme
Court in the Trade-mark Cases, while denying the ability of Congress to enact federal trademark
legislation under the Copyrights and Patents Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 1,
Clause 8, acknowledged that trademark rights represented a "long-recognized" property right
belonging to the mark owner.
Tho Trado-mark Casos, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); soo also Coll. Say.
Bank v. Florida Pre-paid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 529 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) ("The
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items of commercial property whose existence and protection depended solely on the
amount of "commercial magnetism" the marks possessed. 14 This "commercial
magnetism"-reflected by the statutory requirement that the mark be "famous and
distinctive" 15 before it could be transformed into a "pure" property interest6-is

Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable property
interests.").
As early as 1838, the court in Millington v. Fox, 40 Eng. Rep. 956 (Ch. 1838) in dicta indicated
that trademarks were a form of property whose unauthorized use could be prohibited. See also
Scandinavia Betting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber Works of Am., Inc., 257 F. 937, 941 (2d Cir. 1919)
("The right of property in trademarks has come to be recognized as of immense and incalculable
value.").
Nevertheless, until the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"), relief for infringing a
trademark owner's property interest under federal trademark law was based solely on whether such
use resulted in a likelihood of confusion to the public regarding the source or sponsorship of the
goods or services at issue. See, e.g., DORIS E. LONG, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE LANHAI ACT §§
2.4, 2.5 (1993) (discussing the requirement of likely confusion before protection for trademark
infringement attaches). See generaly Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp, 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir. 1961) (establishing an eight factor test of deciding likely confusion). Thus, regardless of
language regarding the "psychological function" which occurred in certain early cases, see, e.g.,
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge, 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942), the reality is that
relief was not available absent some potential public confusion. Consequently, any "property
interest" which a trademark owner had was subject to a case by case analysis of the public interest
involved in protecting such trademark.
This treatment was vastly different from the "property" interests granted copyright and patent
owners. Thus, for example, under U.S. copyright law, protection is granted when a work is
confusingly similar to another's. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977) (granting rights based on public confusion regarding the
sponsorship of certain characters used to advertise defendant's fast food).
The question of public
interest is not raised, except in the nature of the remedies being sought. Thus, for example, a
request for injunctive relief raises an issue regarding the balance of harms, but such balancing is no
different than the balancing used in any other case where the issue of injunctive relief is raised.
11 Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, a trademark owner under the statute is entitled
to relief for dilution regardless of whether such dilution "causes confusion." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(dilution defined as the "lessening of the distinctive capacity of the mark regardless of the presence
or absence of... likelihood of confusion ... "). Thus, aside from the jurisdictional requirement of
interstate commerce in order to obtain relief, a trademark owner must only demonstrate that his
mark is "famous and distinctive" and that the junior user's use "causes dilution." Id. Given the
potentially broad definition of dilution ("blurring" the distinctive quality of the mark), protection
under the Act does not depend on its face on the public interest, but instead on the famousness of
the mark. This places the protection of the property interest in trademarks in accordance with that
recognized by its sister intellectual property forms-copyrights and patents.
I should note, however, that despite the plain language of the statute removing any
consideration of likely confusion, courts have re-inserted these considerations into their analysis of
"likely dilution" under the Act. Thus, for example, in Nabisco Inc. v. PFBrands,Inc., 191 F.3d 208,
227 (2d Cir. 1999), the court in determining a claim of dilution based on the unauthorized use of
goldfish shaped crackers which purportedly infringed plaintiffs goldfish shaped crackers, relied on a
ten-factor test for likely dilution under the FTDA. This test included consideration, inter alia, of the
proximity of the products and the likelihood of bridging the gap, the sophistication of consumers and
the presence of actual confusion as a result of the allegedly diluting use. Id. at 218-19. All of these
factors are key elements in a likelihood of confusion analysis under traditional trademark doctrines.
See supra text accompanying note 13.
1, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (establishing an eight-part test for determining whether marks are
"distinctive and famous"). Courts have generally required marks to qualify as both distinctive and
famous in order to qualify for dilution protection under the FTDA. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co.,

[1:191 2001]

"Unitorrial" Marks and the Global Economy

primarily a reflection of the "price" paid for the mark in advertising dollars and
commercial use. 17 The development of the Internet and the commercial significance
of domain names have changed trademark rights from product and source identifiers
to commercial signposts for digital trade and information exchanges. 18 Indeed, many
scholars have criticized the efforts of trademark owners to "propertize" their rights
into the digital domain 19 by establishing legal remedies for the reservation and use of
20
domain names that simulate marks.
The transformation of trademarks in the latter half of the twentieth century is
not limited to these singular efforts to change trademarks into "pure" property. To
the contrary, global trade and the Internet (among other factors) have further altered
the nature of trademarks so dramatically that old labels are not longer useful.
Instead of being creatures of domestic or territorial creation and action, trademarks
have evolved into "unitorrial" creatures for which new rules of protection must be
created in recognition of this evolution.

II. NINETEENTH CENTURY UNIVERSALITY
Global trade is not a new phenomenon. To the contrary, intercontinental trade
dates back to, at least, the time of Mesopotamia during the third millennium B.C.
21
when it imported raw materials for use in its burgeoning international economy.
Babylonia and Indian societies were reportedly engaging in cross-continental trading
as early as 800 B.C.22 Just as global trade is not a new phenomenon, neither is the
role of trademarks as a means for encouraging international sales based upon the
reputation of a mark. The earliest reported trademark, used to designate the origin
of a particular good, appears to have been a potter's mark found on Mesopotamian
Inc. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001) (mark must be famous and
distinctive for relief under FTDA to lie).
61 In order to qualify for protection under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, a mark must
be both "famous and distinctive." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Such fame must have been acquired prior to
the junior use of the mark under challenge. Id.
17 Fame is largely a reflection of the extent of use of a mark, including its use in advertising
and the amount of goods sold bearing the mark. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (establishing an eight
factor test for fame and distinctiveness that requires consideration of, inter alia, the duration and
extent of the use of the mark and of advertising and publicity for the mark at issue).
18 See infra text accompanying note 112.
19 Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
1687, 1696 (1999) (challenging the "propertization" of trademarks by granting them expanded
protection under inter alia Cybersquatting doctrines and the FTDA).
20 One of the most significant examples of such "propertization" has been the enactment of the
Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act which prohibits the bad faith registration, trafficking
in or use of a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive mark or dilutive of
a famous mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). With a few notable exceptions, trademark owners have
generally been successful in challenging unauthorized domain names containing trademarks. See,
e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000) (unauthorized
registration of domain name containing plaintiffs trade name and mark prevented under Anti
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act). But see Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.Com, Inc., 177
F. Supp. 2d 635, 652 (E.D. Mich. 2001) ("[N]othing in trademark law requires that title to domain
names that incorporate trademarks or portions of trademarks be provided to trademark holders.").
21 HELD & MCGREW, supra note 3, at 152.
22 Id.
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pottery over 3500 years ago.23 While trade and the use of trademarks in such trade
remain a constant, the nature of goods being traded and the scope of such trade has
changed dramatically.
The Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century fueled renewed interest in
"freer trade,"24 which in turn lead to the economic imperialism of the nineteenth
century. 25 This imperialism, with its emphasis on the use of foreign colonies as
sources of raw materials and markets for finished goods, contributed to an explosion
in international trade.2 6 Not only were ever increasing numbers of countries involved
in cross-border trade, but the types of goods being traded expanded beyond the
luxury items of earlier days to items of mass consumption. 27 This growth fueled by,
inter alia, rapidly improving methods for transporting such goods and growing
numbers of consumer for these new consumer products, lead to increasing disputes
over the ability of mark owners to control domestic markets. Early attempts in the
United States to prohibit the unauthorized importation of trademarked goods led
courts to recognize the universal nature of trademark rights.
In one of the earliest reported cases in the United States regarding the
importation of what is now referred to as a "grey market" good, 28 Apollinaris Co. v.
23

See FRANK SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-

MARKS 20 (1925).

William Browne claims earlier uses dating back more than 4000 year ago on
clothing and wares from such diverse places as China, India, Persia, Egypt, Rome and Greece.
WILLIAM H. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 1-14 (1885).
24 This "freer trade" sprang from a key shift in intellectual and political thought, derived
largely from the publication in 1776 of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. As a result, Western
European countries turned from mercantilism to the concept of "free trade" based on the theoretical
underpinnings of comparative advantage. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 14-15 (1997) (discussing the
change from mercantilism to "liberal trade" and the adoption of "comparative advantage"); DONALD
KAGAN ET AL., THE WESTERN HERITAGE 592-94 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing mercantile doctrines
during the eighteenth century); HELD & MCGREW, supra note 3, at 154-55 (discussing mercantilism,
the Wealth of Nations, and the growth of freer trade). While such trade was "freer," it was not
immune from protectionist tendencies, including generally rising tariffs. Id. at 157-61 (examining
rising trade tarrifs among diverse countries from 1820 to 1931).
25 HELD & MCGREW, supra note 3, at 154. I do not mean to suggest that the nineteenth
century imperialism was fueled solely by trade considerations. To the contrary, there are numerous
social, cultural and political motivations that have been suggested for its growth. Nevertheless,
economic motives undoubtedly played a role. See, e.g id. at 93 (discussing various causes and
effects of nineteenth century imperialism).
26 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. See generally MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON,
BARBARIAN VIRTUES: THE UNITED STATES ENCOUNTERS FOREIGN PEOPLES AT HOME AND ABROAD,
1987-1917 (1st ed. 2000) (exploring the use of foreign countries as sources of raw materials and
markets for consumer goods during the late nineteenth century).
27 See, e.g HELD & MCGREW, supra note 3, at 155 (examining the growth of trade in consumer
goods).
28 For a definition of "grey market" goods, see supra note 8 and accompanying text. A
complete discussion of the debates and vagaries surrounding the issue of grey market importation,
and more particularly the impact of the territorial nature of trademark rights on these debates is
beyond the scope of this article. As demonstrated below, however, recognition of the "unitorrial"
nature of trademark rights would have a strong impact on both U.S. and international treatment of
this issue. See discussion infra Part VI. For a general discussion of the issues raised in connection
with the prohibition of the importation of grey market goods, see generally Tait Swanson,
Combating Gray Market Goods in a Global Market: Comparative Analysis of IntellectualProperty
Laws and Recommended Strategies, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 327 (2000); Darren Donnelly, Parallel
Trade and InternationalHarmonization of the Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine, 13 COMPUTER & HIGH
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Seherer,29 the predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized
that trademarks were universal in nature, and, therefore, beyond the control of a
domestic trademark owner. In Apollinaris, the owner of an exclusive right to export
mineral water from a spring in Hungary challenged the unauthorized importation by
a third party of bottled water from the same spring. The defendant importer had
purchased the bottled spring water in Germany. Both the plaintiffs and the
defendant's bottled water were manufactured by the same company in Hungary,
using water from the same spring, and bearing the same legitimately affixed
"Hunyadi Janos" trademark. The court acknowledged that defendant's importation
of "Hunyadi Janos" spring water had deprived the plaintiff of the "substantial
advantage" 30 which it expected to gain from its exclusive U.S. distribution rights with
the Hungarian mark owner:
[The plaintiff] can no longer maintain its own prices for the mineral water,
or hold out the inducements it formerly could to the agents it has selected to
introduce the article to the patronage of the public, and build up a trade. It
can no longer protect itself as efficiently against the chances of a spurious
31
article being palmed off upon the public as its own.
Despite the fact that these harms "measurably deprived [the plaintiff] ...of the
profits . . .contemplated when it purchased ...

the exclusive right of importing water

into this country and selling it here," 32 the court rejected the plaintiffs efforts to rely
on its U.S. trademark in order to prevent the unauthorized importation. The
plaintiff had no "territorial title to the products of the spring." 33 More importantly,

the court found no violation of the plaintiffs rights, since the "Hunyadi Janos" mark
legitimately denoted the source of the goods. Without using the term "universal," the
court recognized that the source-designating function of the mark was not
constrained by the plaintiffs territorial rights:
[T]he defendant is selling the genuine water, and therefore the trade-mark
is not infringed. There is no exclusive right to the use of a name or symbol
or emblematic device except to denote the authenticity of the article with
which it has become identified by association.
The name has no office
except to vouch for the genuineness of the things which it distinguished
from all counterfeits; and until it is sought to be used as false token to
denote that the product or commodity to which it is applied is the product of
commodity which it property authenticates, the law of trademark cannot be
34
invoked.

TECH. L.J. 445 (1997).

See also infra note 38 and accompanying text. For an interesting analogy

between cyberspace and the grey market, see Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in Cyberspace, 7 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 6 (1999).
29 27 F. 18, 21 (1923).

'oId. at 20.
'31Id.
32

Id.

33 Id.
'31 Id. (emphasis added).
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This view of the universal nature of the source-designating role of a lawfully
affixed trademark was repeatedly upheld in the latter decades of the nineteenth
century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. 35 At its heart, the
"universality" doctrine represented the victory of consumer interests over the
"property" interests of trademark owners. In upholding the universal authenticating
function of marks, courts focused on their role as source designators. They made
little or no reference to the role of the owner's goodwill, or to his investment in
36
developing the mark's reputation.
The doctrine of universality was not merely a construction of U.S. courts. To the
contrary, in 1902, the doctrine made its way across the waters and was recognized for
the first time in Continental Europe by the German Reichsgericht in a case involving
the unauthorized importation of French wine under the marks "Mariani Wein" and
"Vin Mariani." 37 The court held that so long as the wine was placed legitimately into
circulation in France the German trademark owner had no territorial right to
prevent its importation. The court based its finding on the view that trademark
rights were not limited to a particular territory. To the contrary, the protection of
marks abroad was considered merely an extension of the rights granted under the
domestic law of the state where the trademark owner was located. 38 Thus, once a
trademark was legitimately affixed to genuine goods, it carried its authenticity with
it. The doctrine was subsequently adopted by numerous other countries in Western
39
Europe, including Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Holland.
Despite its nearly uniform rejection today by scholars, 40 the doctrine of
universality for trademarks was not rejected domestically until 1923, with the
3
See, e.g., id. at 22 (importation of spring bottled water from Hungary bearing "Hunyadi
Janos" mark did not violate U.S. common-law mark holder's rights); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Corp. v.
Schoening, 238 F. 780, 782 (2d Cir. 1916) (holding that importation of violin strings made in
Germany and sold under the mark "Eternelle" did not violate U.S. registered trademark owner's
rights); A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 544 (2nd Cir. 1921), revd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923)
(holding that importation of "Java" face powder did not infringe U.S. rights); see also Walter J.
Derenberg, TerritorialScope and Situs of Trademarks and Goodwill, 47 VA. L. REV. 733, 734 (1961).
'36 In reality, it is this difference in focus that explains most clearly the distinction between
universality and territoriality. Those who actively support greater property rights for trademark
owners rely on their territorial nature to support their claims. See discussions infra Parts 11, HII.
37 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] [Supreme Court] 50, 229 (F.R.G.).
'38 See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, TrademarkLaw and ParallelImports in a Globalized WorldRecent Development in Europe with Special Regard to the Legal Situation in the United States, 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 645, 658 (1999).
'3 Id. at 660-65 (discussing the adoption by various countries of the universality approach to
trademark protection in cases of parallel importation and exhaustion of rights); see also Derenberg,
supra note 35, at 734; First Council Directive (89/104/EEC) of December 21, 1988 to approximate the
law of the Member States relating to trademarks, [1989] O.J. L40/1 February 11, 1989 art. 7 ("The
trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been
put on the market in the Community under that trademark by the proprietor or with his consent.")
[hereinafter Trademark Harmonization Directive].
40
See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects of the Protection of
Trademarks, WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/4 (Jan. 2001) (noting the traditional view of territoriality
for trademarks); Marcello Halpern & Ajay Mehrotra, From International Treaties to Internet
Norms: The Evolution of IntornationalTrademarkDisputes in the Internet Ago, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 523, 528 (2000) (discussing traditional territorial views of trademarks); Doris Estelle Long,
The TerritorialNature of IntelleetualPropertyRights, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW, 373, 374 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997) (describing the classical view that
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landmark decision in A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel,41 discussed more fully in Part
111. Such rejection, however, was not complete because the doctrine remains extant
in the treatment of trademarked goods under the first sale doctrine. Under this
doctrine, the rights of a trademark owner are extinguished (exhausted) upon a sale in
the United States of a legitimately manufactured product placed into commerce with
the consent of the trademark owner. 42 Such exhaustion may be regional in nature
because it only governs sales in the United States, but it applies regardless of any
43
domestic regional distribution agreements the trademark owner may have in place.
So long as the good is genuine, 44 once it is lawfully sold in the United States, the U.S.
45
mark owner's rights are exhausted.
The universality doctrine similarly remains extant in Western Europe with the
use of regional exhaustion to permit cross-border trade within the European Union of
grey market goods first placed legally into commerce in the Union. 46 Like the U.S.
doctrine, the regional exhaustion of rights focuses on the legitimacy of the affixation
of the mark and its entry into commerce. The protection of local goodwill is
47
secondary to protection of consumer interests in freer trade.

trademarks that extend only to the borders of the country in question); see also discussion infra Part
III.
41260 U.S. 689, 691 (1923).
42 See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Shop at Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 816 (M.D. Tenn.
2000) (holding that release of Beanie Babies into commerce ended plaintiffs ability to control their
unauthorized sale by franchisees to a shopping network).
43 Id. at 811.
44 In order to qualify as a "genuine good" under the first sale doctrine, the good must be
lawfully manufactured in accordance with the trademark owner's quality controls and the mark
must be lawfully affixed to the goods. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v A. Genderson & Sons, Inc., 486
F. Supp. 131, 136 (D. Colo. 1980) (prohibiting the domestic distribution of beer manufactured
without following the trademark owner's quality control standards); see also Davidoff & CIE., S.A. v.
PLD Int'l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (goods which are materially different do not
qualify as "genuine" goods).
45 Some courts have questioned whether the universality doctrine properly applies in
connection with the exhaustion of rights. Thus, for example, in Osawa & Co. v. B&HPhoto, 589 F.
Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court rejected efforts to rely upon exhaustion principles to support
universality. Labeling a universality decision as "superficially and deceptively consistent with the
doctrine of exhaustion," the court rejected the application of the universality doctrine in cases where
the U.S. mark owner had developed a separate goodwill. Id. at 1173. As I contend infra in Part VI,
such limitation is wholly consistent with the unitorrial nature of trademarks. Where a truly
independent domestic goodwill has been established, represented by more than the simple act of
registration and use on imported products, such local goodwill becomes the authenticating meaning
of the mark and replaces the foreign mark as the source authenticator.
46 See, e.g., DORIS ESTELLE LONG & ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ch. 40 (West 1999); see also Silhouette Int'l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case No. C-355/96, ECR 1-4799 (1998) (upholding regional exhaustion in
the European Union, but rejecting international exhaustion for goods placed in commerce outside
the European Union under Article 7 of the present Trademark Harmonization Directive).
It is interesting to note that in those cases which uphold the regional exhaustion of marks
within the E.U., the courts place strong emphasis on the free trade goals of the Union and rarely
mention goodwill. Id. Soo generally Baudenbacher, supra note 38 (examining the relationship
between origin and goodwill in E.U. exhaustion cases and noting that strong exhaustion cases place
diminished emphasis on the goodwill function of marks).
47 See, e.g., Silhouette Int'l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG, Case No. C-355/96, ECR 1-4799; see also
LONG & D'AMATO, supra note 46, ch. 40 (examining exhaustion of rights in the European Union).
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The doctrine of universality was undoubtedly a reflection of its times. Efforts by
courts to deal with the increasing number of trademarked items being imported
without a domestic mark owner's consent appeared to reflect the freer trade doctrines
48
being given increasing prominence in the latter decades of nineteenth century.
Emphasizing the public interest (consumer protection from confusion) over the
property interests of local trademark owners was in keeping with trade policies
seeking to promote greater cross-border commerce. While European courts relied on
a personality theory of protection missing in U.S. court decisions, 49 in both regions
courts insisted that the sole issue before them was the authenticity of lawfully affixed
marks. Regional goodwill played little or no role in their decisions. 50 The recognition
of the potential universal source-designating nature of a trademark, I believe,
reflected the perceived role of trademarks and of trademark protection in
international commerce. It also reflected a growing appreciation of the role of fame
in affecting consumers' purchasing decisions.
51
In Russia Cement Co. v. Frauenhar,
the defendant had purchased bulk
quantities of plaintiffs glue from a third party, which the defendant then bottled and
labeled with the plaintiffs "Le Page's Glue" mark. The plaintiff challenged the use of
the mark, claiming that it generally reserved its use of the "Le Page" mark for a
higher grade of glue. Noting that Le Page's Glue claimed on its label to be "known all
over the world as the best for cementing wood, leather, glass, etc.," 52 the court

refused to prohibit the defendant's use of the mark. Citing Apollinaris,53 the court
found that "the label tells the truth, and nothing but the truth. There is no fraud
54
upon the public, for it gets the genuine, identical thing described by the label."

18

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

49 According to Professor Derenberg, the doctrine of universality in Europe viewed trademarks

"as an outgrowth of a right of personality which was deemed to be so closely associated with the
person of their first user that the marks were held entitled to universal protection beyond the
frontiers of the country of origin." Derenberg, supranote 35, at 734.
,0 Territoriality concerns did not, however, completely disappear from U.S. courts' analyses
during this period. To the contrary, territoriality limitations on rights were strongly reflected in the
courts' treatment of common law U.S. trademarks. Thus, for example, in Hanover StarMilling Co.
v. Metcalf 240 U.S. 403, 408 (1916), the Court emphasized the territorial limits of goodwill in
deciding rights between two geographically separate concurrent users of the "Tea Rose" mark for
flour. Rejecting a claim that the prior user's unregistered mark was protectable throughout the
United States, the court stressed that a trademark "extends to every market where the trader's
goods have become known and identified by his use of the mark." Id. at 416. The Court added,
'[b]ut the mark, of itself, cannot travel to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no
traders to offer the article." Id. The Court stressed that a mark owner cannot "monopolize markets
that his trade has never reached, where the mark signifies not his goods, but those of another." Id.;
see also Theodore Rectanus Co. v. United Drug Co., 226 F. 545, 557 (6th Cir 1915) (rights in common
law marks are limited to area of use). Such rational is inapposite to the parallel importation cases
where the universalist doctrine first arose since the marks at issue were already being traded in the
United States. Id.
51 133 F. 518 (2d Cir. 1904).
52 Id. at 520.
53 Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 20 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
F Russia Cement, 133 F. at 520. The court also rejected the plaintiffs concern over possible
confusion about the nature of the goods being purchased due to the various categories of glue that
plaintiff sold under the "Le Page Glue" mark. Id. The court reasoned:
If the public gets an inferior quality of glue when it purchases that bottled by
defendants, it is because the complainant has seen fit to sell such glue under the
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Behind these discussions of authenticity lies the belief that when consumers
purchase products bearing well-known marks, they do not care or consider where the
product is manufactured, or the location of the company owning exclusive territorial
rights to the mark, except when such territorial origins form part of the mark's
reputation.
Instead, consumers purchase the product based largely, if not
exclusively, on the fame or renown of the mark itself. So long as the mark in
question is properly affixed to genuine products, the interests of the consumers are
protected.
This treatment of trademarks as having a universal source-designating function
is reflected by the subsequent treatment of famous marks in Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention"). 55 This
provision, first drafted in 1925,56 requires that "well-known" marks 5' be protected
against the unauthorized use or registration, regardless of whether the mark has
58
been registered in the country at issue.
same trade-name as it had applied to a superior article, and has chosen thus to
reap the profit from the sale to the public of two qualities or grades of the same
article under the same trade-name.

Id.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at
Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1629, art. 6bis (requiring protection for "well-known" marks
against unauthorized use or registration) [hereinafter Paris Convention]. This treatment is in
notable contrast to the general treatment of trademarks under the Paris Convention.
Such
treatment, with its heavy emphasis on regional registration and national treatment, reflects
strongly a territorial approach to trademarks. See, e.g., id. art. 2(1) (establishing national treatment
for trademarks); id. art. 6(3) (establishing the independence of rights under duly registered marks);
Curtis Bradley, TerritorialIntellectualProperty Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L.J.
505, 542 (1997) (noting that the Paris Convention is perceived to establish territorial rights);
Derenberg, supra note 35, at 734; see also Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640
(2d Cir. 1956) ("The [Paris] Convention is not premised upon the idea that the trade-mark and
related laws of each member nation shall be given extraterritorial application, but on exactly the
converse principle that each nation's law shall have only territorial application."); infra Part III.
56 See G. H. C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN

1967, at 89 (1968).

In

1911, the French Delegation to the Washington Diplomatic Conference proposed an additional
provision to the Paris Convention which would give a registered mark owner the right to continue to
use the mark in another country, without a registration, even in the face of registration by a third
party in such country. Id. This effort to obtain concurrent use rights for unregistered marks
presaged the 1925 draft amendment to the Paris Convention that included the requirement of fame
for the protection of such unregistered marks. See Ludwig Baeumer, InternationalLegislative

History Within the Framework of WIPO, and the Recognition and Protection of Famous and Well

Known Marks, in FREDERICK MOSTERT,

FAMOUS AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS 127-28 (1997).
Paris Convention, supra note 55, art. 6bis.
58 Id.
Article 6bis expressly provides that protection shall be granted regardless of the
registration status of the mark, requiring protection for marks "considered by the competent
authority of the country of registration or use to be well-known." Id. art. 6bis (emphasis added); see
also BODENHAUSEN, supra note 56, at 91 cmt. F ('A trademark may be well known in a country
before its registration there ..
" (emphasis added; emphasis in original omitted)). Moreover, such
use was not required within the territorial limits of the country where protection of the mark was
sought. As Professor Bodenhausen remarked in Comment F of his landmark Guide to the Practical
Application of the Paris Convention for the Protectionof IndustrialProperty "A trademark may be
well-known in a country before its registration there and, in view of the possible repercussions of
publicity in other countries, even before it is used in such country." BODENHAUSEN, supra note 56,
at 91 (footnote omitted).
57
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It is intriguing that at the time when protection for famous marks was being
expanded beyond the territorial strictures of local registration, 59 the United States
60
was abandoning the universality principles that support such expansion.

III. THE RISE OF TERRITORIALITY
Despite forty years of support in the United States for the universal nature of
trademarks, in 1925 the Supreme Court in a relatively sparsely reasoned opinion
rejected universalism in favor of the more protectionist "territorial" approach in the
landmark decision A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel.61 In Katze, the plaintiff sought
to prohibit the importation of face powder manufactured in France and bearing the
"Java" trademark. The plaintiff claimed exclusive rights to the mark based on its
purchase of the business and goodwill in the U.S. of the French manufacturer A.
Bourjois & Cie.
The Second Circuit, following Apo]]inar 3 2 and its progeny 63 denied the
plaintiffs request for relief. Relying on the doctrine of universality, the court held
that the rights of
the trademark were not infringed, so long as the goods were
"genuine goods." 64
The court specifically rejected the U.S. trademark owner's
attempt to obtain property rights in its mark based on an equivalency between
patents and trademarks. While acknowledging that patent owners had the right to
prohibit the unauthorized importation of patented items manufactured abroad, the
court found no such right for a trademark owner:
Trade-marks, on the other hand, are intended to show without any time
limit the origin of the goods they mark, so that the owner and the public
may be protected against the sale of one man's goods as the goods of
another man. If the goods sold are the genuine goods covered by the trade65
mark, the rights of the owner of the trade-mark are not infringed.
In a strong dissent, Judge Hough disagreed with the court's limited view of the
role of trademarks in commerce. Stressing the role of goodwill (a factor the majority
did not mention), Judge Hough considered a trademark to be "primarily a protection

., Registration remains at the bulwark of international protection for most marks. Thus,
Article 16 of TRIPS permits domestic registration as a requirement for protection for all but wellknown marks. TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 16 (establishing requirements for the grant of exclusive
rights to the "owner of a registered trademark" (emphasis added)). These domestic registration
requirements lie at the heart of a territorial view of trademarks. See, e.g., Derenberg, supra note
35, at 734 (stating that registration requirements under the Paris Convention made territoriality "a
cornerstone of international trademark law.").
60 While ultimate expansion of Article 6bis to protect well-known marks from unauthorized
use did not occur until the Lisbon Revision of the Paris Convention in 1958, even its early drafts
provided protection for marks that were not registered. See, e.g,., BODENHAUSEN, supra note 56, at
89 cmt. (a); Baeumer, supra note 54, at 127-32.
61 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
62 Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 20 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
6 For the progeny of Apollinaris,see cases discussed supra note 35 and accompanying text
64 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 543 (2nd Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
65 Id.
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to the owner's business."66 Recognizing that such goodwill was territorial in nature,
Judge Hough asserted that the "primary function of the trademark is to protect this
plaintiffs business in his own country." 67 So long as the defendant's importation was
not authorized by the plaintiff, the "genuine" nature of the good was irrelevant.
"That genuine article has become an infringement because the business of dealing in
68
that article within the United States is the plaintiffs business."
The majority and dissenting opinions in the Katze] decision crystallized a
growing dispute between free trade and protectionist forces regarding the role of
trademarks in international trade. While the case was on appeal before the Supreme
Court, Congress sought to overturn the court's decision legislatively, with the
enactment of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922. This section made it illegal to
"import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such
merchandise ...bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation ...
created or organized within, the United States . . .unless the written consent of the
owner is produced at the time of making entry."69 The recognition of territorial
goodwill contained in section 526 as the governing factor in importation disputes was
later reflected in the Supreme Court's oft-cited but sparsely worded opinion which
considered the defendant's importation of the Java powder to violate the plaintiffs
70
rights.
The Supreme Court in A. Bourjois v. Katzet 1 offered three reasons for its
reversal of over four decades of precedent supporting universality of protection of
foreign marks in international trade.
First, unlike the Second Circuit in
Apollinaris,72 the Court found that the destruction in value of the territorial
assignment which would occur if it failed to uphold the plaintiffs ability to control
the U.S. market was contrary to the right granted to trademark owners to make
territorial assignments.7 3 Second (and, in my view perhaps most tellingly), it found
that the analogy between the importation of patented and trademarked goods was
persuasive: "The monopoly in that case [of a patented good] is more extensive, but
we see no sufficient reason for holding that the monopoly of a trade-mark, so far as it
goes, is less complete." 74 Describing such monopoly as "a delicate matter that may be
of great value but is easily destroyed," 75 the Court insisted that the protection of this
6 Id. (Hough, J., dissenting).
G7 Id.
68 Id. at 544.
69 19 U.S.C. § 526 (1923). This section of the Tariff Act of 1922 was later superceded by § 526
of the Tariff Act of 1930 and was repealed by § 651(a)(1) of the 1930 Act. This section remains in
effect today. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (2000). Its broad prohibitions against the unauthorized importation
of grey market trademarked goods has been the subject of heated debate. U.S. Customs regulations
under the Act narrowed the scope of protection afforded by limiting exclusion to goods for which no
relationship between the U.S. mark owner and the foreign manufacturer existed. This limitation
was largely upheld by the Supreme Court in the seminal decision KMa-rt Corp. v. Cartier,Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 311 (1988), in which the Court recognized that Customs could properly allow the
importation of grey market trademarked goods where there was, inter alia, a common control or
ownership between the two companies.
70 Katze4, 260 U.S. at 691. The Court did not refer to Section 526 in its decision.
71 Id.
72 Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 20 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
73 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691.
74 Id.

75Id.
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delicate monopoly required "corresponding care." 76 Such "care" was reflected in the

Court's insistence that "[oiwnership of the [trademarked] goods does not carry the

77
right to sell them at all in a given place."

Finally, to support its protectionist stance with regard to trade in parallel goods,
the Court insisted that such territorial protection was required to protect the
goodwill of the U.S. mark owner. Rejecting the source authentication role of the
universalist approach, the Court insisted that the "Java" mark did not reflect the
French origin of the goods. Instead, it "indicates in law, and it is found, by public
understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff although not made by it.... It
stakes the reputation of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods." 78
Given the strong barriers to international trade raised by the territorial
property interests reflected in the Court's decision in Katze, it is unremarkable that
the territoriality principle expounded by this decision has remained extant for over
eighty years. 79 Despite increasing debates over the propriety of grey market
protection for trademarks,80 and a subsequent reduction of the scope of such
protection by the Court in KMart Corp. v. Cartier,Ine.,8 1 territoriality appears to be
a firmly entrenched principle of U.S. trademark law.
Territoriality also appears to be a firmly entrenched principle of international
law. The Paris Convention on its face appears to treat trademarks primarily as
territorial creatures.8 2 In addition to recognizing that trademarks could be subject to
domestic registration requirements,8 3 the Paris Convention specifically recognized
the independence of rights derived from individual domestic registration. Article 6
76 Id.

77 Id.
78 Id.
It is interesting to note that in reaching this decision the Court cited no evidence to
support its conclusion regarding the "public understanding" of the source of the good.
7
Among the cases which considered territoriality to be the governing rule of U.S. law post-

Katzel are Societe des ProduitsNestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 636-37 (1st Cir.
1992), Roger & Gallet v. Janmarie,Inc., 245 F.2d 505, 509-11 (C.C.P.A. 1957), and Osawa & Co. v.
B&HPhoto, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
80 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Despite increasing demands for the elimination
of trade barriers to international trade, represented most clearly by the establishment of GATT in
1948, and of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in 1995, protectionist tendencies seem firmly
entrenched as method for protecting domestic industries, particularly in times of economic upheaval.
See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS ch. 9 (2001) (exploring some loophole practices in the free trade regulatory
regimes of GATT and WTO).
81 486 U.S. 281 (1988); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text. The reduction in
protection against grey markets was alleviated to a certain extent by the Second Circuit in its
seminal decision in Lever Brothers v. UnitedStates, 981 F.2d 1330, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (requiring
U.S. Customs to prevent the importation of goods under common ownership or control where
"material differences" exist between the goods). See also Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878
F.2d 659, 667 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying common ownership and control rationale to cases under
Section 42).
82 See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
83 The Paris Convention assumes, without requiring that countries could generally require the
domestic registration of marks prior to their protection in a particular site. See, e.g., Paris
Convention, supra note 55, art. 6(1) (conditions for filing and registration of trademarks "shall be
determined in each country of the Union by its domestic legislation"); id. arts. 6ter, 6quinquies
(establishing the bases on which countries may deny applications to register trademarks); id. art.
6septies (permitting the cancellation of registrations obtained without the permission of the
trademark owner).
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required that a mark "duly registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded as
independent of marks registered in the other countries of the Union, including the
country of origin."8 4 Similarly, Article 6quater of the Paris Convention upholds the
legality of territorial assignments of goodwill. It provides:
When, in accordance with the law of a country of the Union, the assignment
of mark is valid only if it takes place at the same time as the transfer of the
business or goodwill to which the mark belongs, it shall suffice for the
recognition of such validity that the portion of the business or goodwill
located in the country be transferred to the assignee, together with the
exclusive right to manufacture in the said country, or to sell therein, the
5
goods bearing the mark assigned.8
These provisions, along with the national treatment requirement of Article 2,86
have been relied upon by scholars as establishing territoriality as "a cornerstone of
international trademark law."87 This territoriality appears to be carried forward in
TRIPS, since Article 16 of TRIPS allows countries to premise protection for all but
well-known marks upon domestic registration.88 Even some of the expansion in
protection granted to famous marks under TRIPS has been premised on the existence
of a registration for the mark in question. In Article 16(3), TRIPS required that
protection for famous marks under Article 6bis be extended to include the prohibition
against use of such famous marks on dissimilar goods and services.8 9 Such expanded
protection is limited, however, to goods and services which "are not similar to those

Id. art. 6(3) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 6quater(1).
S Id. art. 2. National treatment basically requires that no discrimination in treatment occurs
between foreign and domestic intellectual property rights owners.
87 Derenberg, supra note 35, at 734; eLf 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:25, at 29-46 to 47 ("The [Paris Convention] is not premised upon the
idea that the trademark laws of each member nation shall be given extraterritorial application, but
on exactly the converse principle that each nation's law shall have only territorial application."
(footnote omitted)). See generallyDinwoodie, supra note 40, at 8 (declaring that national treatment
and the principle of independence of rights "affirm in different ways and with different strength the
principle of territoriality");
Bradley, supra note 55, at 543 (discussing the rejection of the
universality theory with the adoption of the Paris Convention).
Professor Derenberg also cited Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, concerning the protection
of unregistered well-known marks, as evidence of the foundational role of territoriality. Derenberg,
supra note 35, at 734. It appears, however, that he was relying on the pre-Lisbon version of Article
6bis since he states that Article 6bis "permits simultaneous and concurrent registration of the same
trademark for the same product by manufacturers or other merchants who are members of one
closely knit economic unit, provided that such joint ownership or registration will not result in a
deception of the public or otherwise be found contrary to the public interest." Id. at 443. Professor
Derenberg does not provide other information about the reference in question. Because Article 6bis
requires protection without regard to domestic registration or use, it does not appear to support
territoriality with the same clarity as (potentially) Article 6quater. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
88 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 16 (requiring the granting of exclusive rights to "[t]he owner of a
registeredmark. . ." (emphasis added)).
89 Id. art. 16(3).
8

85
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90
in respect of which a trademark has been registered."
Thus, before protection
against use on non-competing goods is required, even a famous mark must be
registered domestically.

IV.

"TERRITORIALITY" RE-EXAMINED

Although the principle of "territoriality" has been applied to trademarks for well
over eighty years, in reality there are numerous types of territoriality that are
involved. Not all "territoriality" principles are created equally.

A. TerritorialRegistration
Local registration is plainly a recognition of the territorial prerogative of the
sovereign to create trademark rights within its borders. To the extent that
trademarks are creatures of domestic legislation-where local domestic marks, with
their own local goodwill are concerned-the recognition of the sovereign's right to
require registration for such protection may be nothing more than the doctrine of
sovereign prerogative given affect in the trademark arena.
Such sovereign
prerogatives, however, have not been quite so rigidly maintained in the latter
decades of the twentieth century. 91
Moreover, such local sovereignty begs the question of whether trademarks are
creatures of purely domestic application. If trademarks, like patents, are nothing
more than locally created rights (represented by local domestic registrations),92 then
they are truly territorial in nature and should have no existence outside the narrow
confines of local protection. Territorial goodwill would, therefore, be the sole
motivating factor behind their existence and protection. Exhaustion, except in the
narrow confines of domestic first sale doctrines, 93 would play no role in the protection
of cross border trademarked goods and services. The reality, however, is markedly
different.
90 Id. (emphasis added). Protection was further restricted to instances where the use of the
mark at issue "would indicate a connection between those goods and services and the owner of the
registered trademark and provided that the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are
likely to be damaged by such use." Id. This provision in essence provides some from of relief for
dilution. See generally DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS (1998) (describing Article 16(3) as protecting against "dilution"). This requirement of
domestic registration before protection must be extended to non-competing goods and services also
appears in the European Union Trademark Harmonization Directive. Trademark Harmonization
Directive, supra note 39, art. 4(3). The limited nature of the grant appears to be based more on the
radical nature of dilution protection internationally than on the territorial nature of trademarks.
91
See, e.g., Doris Estelle Long, "Democratizing"Globalization: Practicing the Policies of
Cultural Inclusion, _
CARDOZO J. INT'L L.
- (2002) (forthcoming) (discussing the Joint
Recommendations of WIPO governing famous marks and the Internet and their effect as
international soft law).
92 Unlike trademarks, patents may only be protected in those nations where the patent owner
has been granted a patent. There is no such thing as protection for a patent across borders, unless
the invention has been subject to a domestically granted patent. See LONG & D'AMATO, supra note
46, at ch. 24.
93 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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Although registration remains the primary method for assuring protection of
marks domestically, there are numerous marks that fall outside this narrow
registration parameter. Most significantly, even under the Paris Convention, which
has been considered one of the plainest indications of the territorial nature of marks
internationally, famous marks are specifically protected without regard to their
domestic registration status. 94 This fact alone would seem to indicate that
territoriality based on sovereign control over domestic registration cannot be
considered absolute evidence of territoriality for all marks.

B. TerritorialEnforcement
Enforcement-based territoriality is premised on the need to enforce rights in
some particular forum against a perceived violation. This territoriality principle is
perhaps most strongly demonstrated in the national treatment provisions of the
Paris Convention and TRIPS. 95 Yet such territoriality of enforcement does not
require that the right to be enforced be purely territorial in nature. It merely
requires that when rights are to be enforced there should be no discrimination in
requirements and remedies between marks owned by locals and those owned by
foreigners. Even in early universalist cases, such as Apollinaris, 96 the court applied
domestic (territorial) law to uphold non-territorial rights.
Thus, the simple
requirement of even-handed application of laws represented by national treatment
doctrines does not per se convert marks into purely territorial creatures. Human
rights similarly require the application of domestic laws to ensure their local
protection, yet such domestic application does not mean that these rights are not
considered universal in nature.

C. TerritorialGoodwill
The strongest argument posed in support of territoriality of marks seems to be
the recognition of territorial goodwill. But does the territorial nature of localized
goodwill necessarily convert all marks into territorial marks? Behind the age-old
dispute between territorial and universal rights is a more fundamental dispute over
the role that trademarks play in commerce. Are they, as the Court in Katzel
proclaimed, the representative of domestic goodwill? 97 Or are they, as the court in
Apollinaris decided, consumer designators of authenticity? 98 While the courts in
those cases treated the question as an "either/or" proposition, the answer to both
questions appears to be "yes." The more difficult question is: are trademarks then
always representative of domestic goodwill? While territorialists would undeniably
answer "of course," their answer does not appear to reflect present reality.
94 See Paris Convention, supra note 55, art. 6bis; TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 16; see also supra
notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
W, See Paris Convention, supranote 55, art. 2; TRIPS, supranote 7, art. 3.
96 Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 20 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
97 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 690 (1923).
98 Apollinaris,27 F. at 20.
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Assume that Company A, a manufacturer of French perfume under the PARIS
NULIT mark, has obtained a trademark registration in its domicile of France. It has
also registered its mark in the United States and Canada where it sells its PARIS
NUIT perfume. Surely the separate registration of the mark in these countries does
not automatically transform the meaning of the affixed trademark from a universal
source designator of perfume manufactured in France into one that automatically
has separate territorial goodwill in Canada and the United States? Such result
would elevate registration (which is not required for the protection of all marks) into
a local act of singular (and I would say unwarranted) significance. The simple
transference from Company A of its rights in the PARIS NUIT mark to a local
company, without more, similarly should not transform a universal authenticator
into a domestic one.

V. UNIVERSALITY RECONSIDERED

Just as universality was rejected in the 1920's in the United States in the wake
of increased protectionist measures in the arena of international trade, it should now
be reconsidered in the face of a vastly changed global marketplace that has altered
the role and nature of trademarks.
In criticizing early universalist decisions, the court in Osawa & Company v.
B&H Photo99 remarked: "The [universalist] principle was perhaps based on an
idealistic view of the world as a single marketplace. That view, however, did not
conform to reality or to international treaty."100 If no such "world" market existed in
1984 in the face of increasing international trade, it probably also does not exist yet
in today's globalized marketplace. Yet the reality of such a single world market is
becoming more likely in the light of the rapid globalization that occurred after the
break up of the Soviet Union in 1989.101 With the rapid advances of global trade and
the advantages of electronic commerce represented by the Internet, 1 2 the "McWorld"
of Benjamin Barber, 10 3 and the "Lexis" of Thomas Friedman10 4 are increasingly
marked by the unique role of certain trademarks in the development of a global
consumer culture. As described by global economists and culturalists, a global
commercial culture is based largely on Western consumer images of technological
advancement and popular culture-fast food, fast computers, fast music and fast
news, purveyed under such famous marks as McDONALD'S, COCA-COLA, MTV,
and CNN. 105

9 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
100 Id. at 1172.
101 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 5-9 (describing the rapid integration of markets as a result
of technological advances); Long, supra note 91 (describing the impact of technology on the
development of a global marketplace in the latter decades of the twentieth century).
102 See, e.g., Long, supra note 91 (discussing the impact of e-commerce on international trade).
103 BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD V. MCWORLD (1st ed. 1996).
104 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 31.
105 See generally Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous
Culture: An Intellectual PropertyPerspective, 23 NO. CAR. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 229 (1998)
(describing the advance of a global consumer culture and the role of multinationals and their
symbols in this culture).
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The unique role of CNN, MTV, McDONALD'S and COCA-COLA (to name a few
of the more prominent corporate symbols that have become identified with the march
of this new globalized economy) underscores the nearly global reputation that certain
source designators have achieved during the latter decades of the twentieth century.
This status as a "world mark" is based largely on the authenticating role these
symbols play as indicators of a single source for the goods. Although McDonald's
10 6
restaurants may have slight differences in their menu or d6cor to meet local tastes,
local customers are attracted to the restaurant for the representational value of the
mark as a symbol of western consumer culture. 10 7 Such representational role places
trademarks much closer to the universal authenticators of Apollinaris'0 8 than to the
territorially delimited marks of Katze].10 9
While international commerce during the early and middle decades of the
twentieth century remained largely the domain of multinational corporations, the
rapid growth of the Internet has made the viability of global trade a reality for many
small companies.110 With the increased opportunity for global trade, through the
opportunities of e-commerce, comes the equal opportunity for developing increasing
numbers of marks so famous they have a global authentication role.
Cyberspace has already demonstrated that the global digital environment
presents new issues of territoriality unforeseen in earlier technological advances.
The potentially borderless (territorial-less) nature of cyberspace has created sharp
debates among scholars regarding the nature of legal control over Internet content.
Whether the Internet is a "borderless" new territory that requires its own legal
1
regulations, 1 or merely an electronic extension of the current bordered world, 12
there is no question that the Internet has changed the nature of trademark rights.
The use of trademarks in this new digital environment has expanded to include a
new role-as a source-designator for websites and digital information.1 1 3 This
106 Michael Wallace Gordon, HamburgersAbroad: Cultural VariationsAffecting Franchising

Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 165, 170-80 (1994) (discussing various culturally required changes in
McDonald's franchises).
107 See generalyROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW (1998) (detailing how cultures change commodities
using trademarks and other symbols to express their own ideologies).
108 Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 20 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
109 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 690 (1923).
110 Although structure requirements remain daunting for non-industrial countries, the
number of enterprises which are not affiliated with a large multinational and which are using the
Internet for advertising and/or distributing their goods and services continues to rise. E-Marketer
claims that that in 2001 over seventy-eight percent of all U.S. small businesses would be conducted
on the Web with over one-half of these companies owning "active, purposeful websites." E-Marketer,

The

E-Commerce

Snapshot Report for

Small Business,

at http://www.emarketer.com/

reports/snapshot sm biz (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). Foreign penetration is less, but is predicted to
continue to grow at a dramatic rate. See E-Marketer, The E-GLOBAL Report, available at
http://www.emarketer.com/ereports/eglobal/welcome.20010816.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).

111 See generally David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (contending that cyberspace is a borderless environment
which should be governed by its own legal regime).
112 See generally Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial
Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 475 (1998) (contending that the Internet is a bordered

world, governed by territorial sovereignty).
11,3See, e.g. Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2nd Cir. 2000)
(describing the rapid growth of the "commercial side of the Internet" including the use of web pages
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function, represented by domain names1 14 currently used as quasi-addresses, quasisource identifiers in the digital world, is directly contrary to the territorially limited
nature of trademarks established by Katzel.115 Although domain names are not
"pure" trademarks, since their first role is to serve as an easily remembered address
for a particular page on the Internet, 11 6 as the development of international dispute
resolution mechanisms, such as the UDRP, 117 and of international registration
protocols by ICANN 118 demonstrate, they also have a source-designating role that
implicates traditional trademark concerns. 119
Domain names undoubtedly have a potentially territorial situs, in the location of
the domain name registry, the web server, and/or the domain name owner. They are
also immediately usable, and used, in every country where the web page can be
accessed. 120 This global potentiality makes them a far different creature than the
territorially constrained marks of Katzel and its progeny whose use was potentially
limited to those countries where the physical goods were present.1 21 As the WIPO
Standing Committee on Trademarks recognized in developing its Recommendations
on the protection of trademarks on the Internet, 22 "one of the main peculiarities of
"to provide information about their products in a much more detailed fashion than can be done
through a standard advertisement").
''I Every website has an address similar to a telephone number or street address. Domain
names serve as the easily recognizable identifier for a given web site address. Because of their
unique function, domain names are at once nothing more a telephone number and a "website
identifier." See generally Panavision Int'l LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (domain
names are "web identifiers").
1
A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 690 (1923).
116 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
117 The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy ('UDRP") developed by ICANN is a private
enforcement method for settling disputes between trademark owners and domain name registrants
for bad faith registration and use of a domain name for which the registrant has no rights or
legitimate interests in the domain name. See generally Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, at http://www.icann.org/urdp/udrp.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002); see also Halpern &
Mehrota, supra note 40, at 524 (discussing problems with current ICANN governance which fails to
recognize the "common law" of the Internet).
118 Most recently, protocols to permit the registration of domain names under new .info top
level domains have made special provisions to allow trademark owners the right to challenge
attempts to register domain names which might conflict with pre-existing trademark rights. See,
e.g., WIPO Guide to the Afilias Sunrise Registration Challenge Policy for info, at http://
arbiter.wipo.int/domains/gtld/info/sunrise/ guide.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). See generally
Marshall Leaffer, Domain Names, Globalization and Internet Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 139 (1998) (reviewing problems posed by quasi-private governance of the Internet and
methods for reforming it to meet the challenges posed under traditional trademark laws).
119 Whether protection for domain names is eventually governed by "trademark" or "domain
name" systems is yet to be fully decided. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National)Trademark
Laws and the (Non-National)Domain Name Systems, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 495, 520 (2000)
(exploring the dual systems for protection that exist and suggesting that domain names should be
governed by an independent system of first principles).
120 See, e.g Vanity Fair Mills Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956) ("passing
off occurs . . . where the deceived customer buys the defendant's product .. "); Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (single download of infringing material
sufficient to establish jurisdiction).
121 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
122 See Protection of Marks and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet,
WIPO Doe. No. SCT/6/2, available at www.wipo.int/set/er/documents/session_6/index.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2002).
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the Internet is its 'global' nature, the fact that a sign used on the Internet is
'
simultaneously and immediately accessible irrespective of territorial location. 23
This immediate accessibility "challenges the territorial basis of laws relating to
rights in marks or other signs."1 24 Because the Internet lacks physical borders per
se, 125 determining the territorial situs of use of a trademark on the Internet becomes
problematic. With global accessibility of web pages bearing digital marks and
126
domain names, the "territoriality" of such marks seems even less defensible.
The growing recognition of the non-territorial nature of famous marks similarly
underscores the increasingly universal nature of trademarks in the twenty-first
century. While scholars and courts continue to view the Paris Convention as
evidencing the territorial nature of marks, 127 the reality is that the enactment of
Article 6bis called into question the continuing territoriality of at least well-known
marks. As finally established in 1958,128 Article 6bis radically altered territorial
aspects of trademarks under the Paris Convention. Although it gives "the competent
authority of the country of registration or use" 129 the duty of determining that the
mark is "well-known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to
the benefits of this Convention, "1 3 such territorially-based obligations have more to
do with the territoriality of enforcement, than the territoriality of the mark qua
mark.
Even though fame under Article 6bis may be determined by a territorial
authority, the source of that fame is not so territorially circumscribed. Article 6bis
does not require that a mark be used in a particular country, in order to achieve fame
in that country.
The reporter's comments of Professor Bodenhausen plainly
anticipate that fame could arise from use outside the country in question.13 1 The
non-territorial-based use required for the expanded protection of well-known marks
was further underscored in Article 16 of TRIPS. Article 16 expressly requires that
countries "take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of
123 Id. note 1.06.
124 Id.
125 I do not mean

to indicate that the Internet lacks any physical nature whatsoever. To the
contrary, web servers and end users (to name only two such examples) have an undoubted physical
presence. See Special Report-Geography and the Net-PuttingIt in Its Place, THE ECONOMIST,
AUG. 11, 2001, at 18-20 (discussing the physical geography of the Internet in the form of servers,
cables, etc.). But such physical elements do not contain the same physicality as the face powder in
A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), or the spring water of Apoifinaris Co. v. Scherer,27
F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
126 See, e.g., Dan Burk, Trademark Doctrines for GlobalElectric Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV.
695, 705 (1998) (exploring the changes affected by the development of a global digital market, the
centrality of trademarks to its development, and the international solutions required). As noted
below, I do not contend that a mark does not have some original territorial situs. Admittedly, the
mark must first be created and/or used in a particular country. Such first use is required even for
domain names and digital marks on the Internet. However, the territorial nature of this first use
does not transform marks automatically into purely territorial creatures for purpose of intellectual
property protection and enforcement.
127 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
128 The present version of Article 6bis is derived from the 1958 Lisbon Conference. See supra
note 60.
Paris Convention, supra note 55, art. 6bis.
1o30Id.
1,31 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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the publc, including knowledge in that [country] . . . obtained as a result of the
promotion of the trademark." 132 There is no requirement that such promotion occur
in the country in question-only that domestic consumers in some way have been
exposed to the mark.
This recognition of source functionality based on non-territorial use is not
unique to famous marks in the present global marketplace. To the contrary, the
international recognition of geographic indications and appellations of origin
similarly establish regimes where a sole source function for a term is protected
beyond the borders where such source functionality developed.
As recognized under Articles 22 and 23 of TRIPS, "geographic indications" are
terms, symbols and other "indications" which "identify a good as originating in the
territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin." 133 The reputational nature of the geographic indication is based
on the reputation of that indication in the country where the good originates-notin
the country where the good itself is being sold. Thus, for example, the geographic
indication "Burgundy" is protected against unauthorized uses because the term is
considered in France to indicate a red wine grown in the Burgundy region of France,
which has certain special characteristics. Because the French consider the term the
indicator of certain characteristics of a particular good from their country, it may not
be used by other countries even if the wine at issue is prepared from the same types
of grapes. 134 Thus, the authenticating nature of geographic indications, like famous
marks under Article 6bis, is not based on individual territorial reputations, but on a
universal meaning.
Admittedly this universal reputation is not absolute. Article 24 of TRIPS allows
individual countries to decline protection to a geographic indication where such
indication "is identical with the term customary in the common language as the
common name for such goods . .. in the territory of that Member." 135 Under this
provision, the United States has declined to treat "chablis" as a protected indication
on the grounds that such term is the generic term among the U.S. public for "white
wine."1 3 6 The ability of one sovereign to decline protection to another's geographic
indication, however, is rapidly being rejected among many developed and developing
countries who are selecting an international protection regime which denies
territorial abilities to control the authenticating function of geographic indications.
TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 16(2).
13 -Id. art. 22(1).
13 Id. art. 23. The protection for geographic indications for wines and spirits is admittedly
stronger than that required for geographic indicators for other products under Article 22. For
example, under Article 22, geographic indications need only be protected if their unauthorized use
'misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good." Id. art. 22(2). By contrast,
132

unauthorized geographic indications for wines and spirits are prohibited without the need for proof
that the public has been misled. Id. art. 23. Such differences, however, do not alter the fact that for
both categories of geographic indications, protection is based on the meaning of the term to the
consumers in the country of origin-not in the country of sale or use.
1'' Id. art. 24(c).
136 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Geographical Indications, available at
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/globalip/geographicalindication.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002)
(contending that chablis and champagne represent generic terms in the United States for white
wine and light-colored wine with bubbles, respectively).
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The Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Geographic Indications13 7 does not
permit registered "appellations of origins," which are a form of geographic
indication, 138 to be treated as a generic term unless the country of origin treats it as
such. 139 Although the Lisbon Agreement has relatively few signatories, its numbers
are increasing. 140 Moreover, the treatment of appellations of origin as protectable
unless the country of origin considers the term to be generic forms an integral part of
European Union law. Under Regulation 2081/92, governing the protection of
appellations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, 1 4 1 the critical factor in
deciding whether an applied-for appellation of origin is a generic term is the use in
the Member country. 142 Moreover, once the appellation of origin has been registered,
it cannot be subsequently denied protection on grounds of genericness, absent
approval of the originating country. 143 Thus, with the expansion of the E.U. as new
countries seek admission, increasing numbers will no doubt accept the universalist
treatment of geographic indications.
Geographic indications, like domain names, are not "pure" trademarks. Yet they
clearly serve a source authenticating function. More importantly, some countries,
like the United States, meet their obligation to protect geographic indications under
domestic trademark laws. 144 Thus, universalist tendencies demonstrated under the
protection of geographic indications internationally also supports renewed
consideration of universalist trademarks.
Finally, although the territorial registration provisions of the Paris Convention
strongly support a territorialist view of trademarks, 145 such registrations are no
longer required for marks to be protected. Countries such as Great Britain are
increasingly protecting unregistered marks in their country, including unregistered
137 The Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International
Registration of October 31, 1958 as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and as amended on
September 28, 1979, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/registration/lisbon/agreement.html
(last visited Apr. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Lisbon Agreement].
1,38

The Lisbon Agreement defines an "appellation of origin" as "the geographical name of a

country, region or locality which serves to designate a product originating therein, the quality and
characteristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment,
including natural and human factors." Id. art. 2(1). This is a narrower category of geographic
indications than that required to be protected under TRIPS, because, inter alia, it requires that
protection be granted for quality differences based on environmental factors. By contrast the TRIPS
definition of a protectable geographic indication permits, but does not require, that quality
differences be based on environmental factors. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
139 Lisbon Agreement, supra note 137, art. 6.
140 The Agreement currently has twenty signatories as of January 15, 2002. Many of the new
signatories are developing countries, seeking admission to the European Union.
141 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 of July 14, 1992 on the Protection of Geographical
Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L208) 1.
142 Id. art. 3.
143 Id. art. 10.
"I The United States protects geographic indications generally as certification marks. See
generally Jnstitut National Des Appellations v. Brown-Forman Group, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875 (T.T.A.B.
1998) (recognizing that "cognac" is a valid common law regional certification mark );see also U.S.
Reg. No. 1,632,726 (registration date January 22, 1991) (permitting registration of DARJEELING
for tea from India).
145 See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 55, art. 6 (independence of trademark rights); id.
art. 6quater (territorial assignments of goodwill permitted); see also supra notes 83-87 and
accompanying text.
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foreign marks, under doctrines of passing off.146 While "passing off' relief has its
foundation in unfair competition doctrines, the practical effect of this growing trend
is an acknowledgement that arbitrary territorial limitations on marks based on
domestic registrations are no longer relevant to the protection of such marks.

VI. "UNITORRIAL" MARKS

Marks are no longer, if they ever were, creatures of purely territorial invention.
The Internet, the increasingly globalized fame of certain marks, and the ever
expanding role of international trade in trademarked goods and services have pushed
such marks more strongly into the role of universal source designators. Trademarks
are rapidly approaching the "world" marks at the heart of early universalist theories.
Globalization has created not merely a world-wide demand for foreign produced
goods, but a world-wide prominence for the marks that these goods carry. The global
consumer culture at the heart of twentieth century economic globalization is centered
on the emergence of globally recognized authenticators. The recognition of the global
authenticating function of these marks is amply demonstrated by the increased
emphasis placed on protecting the global goodwill of such marks.
Thus, for example, in the United States, dilution protects famous marks from
147
being used on unauthorized goods, even where no likelihood of confusion exists.

Internationally, famous marks are protected against local uses even in the absence of
local use by the famous mark owner.14 8 The continued emphasis on the need for
heightened protection of famous marks led to an expansion in 1994 to the protection
of such marks from goods to services. 149 It has even led to the establishment of soft
law to assure that famous marks are protected without regard to registration or
use. 150 WIPO's Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of
Well-Known Marks15 1 emphasizes obligation to "take into account any circumstances
from which it may be inferred that the mark is well-known." 152 Among the new areas
that ought to be considered are the "use of the mark in ...territories in which the
same language or languages are spoken . . .or in territories which have close trade

relations." 153 Such expanded protection would be indefensible if trademarks were not
perceived as representing a goodwill unbounded by territorial concerns.
16 See, e.g. Taittinger v. Allbev Ltd., [1994] 4 All ER 75, [1993] FSR 641 (C.A. (Civil) 1993)
(prohibiting the use of "champagne" to advertise Elderflower wine under the doctrine of passing off).
11 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
148 See Paris Convention, supranote 55, art. 6bis.
149 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 16(2) (protection for famous marks under Article 6bis is expanded
to services).
15oSee, e.g,., Long, supra note 91 (discussing the use of soft law in international law, including
the WIPO Joint Recommendations).
1)' Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks
adopted by The Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the
General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) at the Thirty-Fourth
Series of Meetings of the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO September 20 to 29, 1999,
availableat http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/developmentiplaw/doc/pub833.doc (last visited Apr. 20,
2002).
152 Id. art. 2.
153 Id. note 2.4
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The foundational principles for territorial assignments of goodwill, which lay at
the heart of the switch to territoriality in the early decades of the twentieth century,
have altered dramatically since KatzeP54 and Article 6quater of the Paris
Convention.155 The protection of territorial assignments in Katze] was premised on
two mistaken assumptions. The first was that protection of the value of the
assignment necessarily required a prohibition on grey market goods. This decision
was made based on an inappropriate analogy to patented goods, which, unlike
trademarks, are purely territorial creatures with no existence beyond domestic
borders. 156 The second inappropriate assumption was that a U.S. trademark owner
who only supplies foreign manufactured goods automatically has a mark that
"indicates ...

157
Yet there was no indication
that the goods come from the plaintiff."

that any local business reputation was represented by the "Java" mark.
Article 6quater of the Paris Convention recognized that countries could require
the domestic transfer of related business assets without violating international
norms. 158 By 1994, the right to require domestic transfer of a business asset (a true
territorial act of affirmation of the business related nature of local trademark's
reputation) was eliminated. Instead, under Article 20 of TRIPS, owners of registered
trademarks must have the right to assign the goodwill in the mark "with or without
the transfer of the business to which the trademark belongs." 159 A mark is no longer
tied to the physical assets of a business, but instead has a reputational value that is
beyond such physical requirements.
Such lack of physicality supports the
burgeoning universality of trademarks.
All these changes in the nature of trademark use and protection demonstrated
that universality must be reconsidered as the basis for trademark protection. This
reconsideration does not mean that no territorial limitations remain in connection
with the recognition and enforcement of trademarks. To the contrary, the same
concern over marks that have a separately developed local goodwill, which drove the
Supreme Court in KatzeP60 to mistakenly adopt territoriality as the governing
principle for trademark protection in the United States, remains today. Trademark
owners in a particular country that offer warranties or create their own identities as
mark owners in that country may well have a right to protect this separate interest
in the mark. 161 What has changed, however, is the incorrect assumption that such
separately developed goodwill is not automatically established by domestic
ownership. It is significant that in a treaty which recognized that patents are purely
territorial creatures for which a domestic right holder can exercise control over
163
unauthorized imports, 162 it did not establish a similar right for trademark owners.
154 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
Paris Convention, supra note 55, art. 6quater.
15, See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
157 Katze], 260 U.S. at 692.
158 Paris Convention, supra note 55, art. 6quater (providing that if a country requires transfer

of the business or goodwill to which the mark belongs for a valid assignment it is sufficient to
transfer "the portion of the business or goodwill located in that country").

5 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 20.
160 260 U.S. 689.
161 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
162 See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 27 (granting patent owners the right to control the
importation of patented products).
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Thus, while marks continue to maintain certain aspects of territoriality, this
territoriality has been strongly flavored by the overweening universality of their
nature. These new "unitorrial" marks demand a renewed examination of the nature
of trademark rights in the global, digital marketplace.
At its most obvious level, unitorrial marks demand stronger protection for
famous marks. Registration and territorial use requirements for domestic protection
are wholly unwarranted in view of the potential universality of the goods their marks
possess. Geographic indications have already pointed the way to treatment of
unitorrial marks. They are protected based primarily on their source-designating
ability in the country of origin. I do no mean to suggest that a domestically famous
mark should automatically qualify for global protection. But neither should a mark
with a level of international fame be restricted to protection solely in those territories
where the mark is actually used. Protection against unauthorized use of famous
marks on non-competing goods similarly should not be limited to marks with a
domestic registration, as currently required under Article 16 of TRIPS,164
particularly where some level of source confusion is required. Such territorial
limitations appear at odds with the unitorrial nature of these marks.
The unitorrial nature of trademarks poses perhaps the greatest challenge to the
re-evaluation of the international status of grey market goods. The automatic
assumption of domestic borders and defensible "no transit" zones for grey market
trademarked goods erected by territorialism were never so absolute as they
appeared. The "loopholes" of first sale, 165 regional exhaustion, 166 and common control
exclusions1 67 have already lessened the strength of those physical boundaries. The
Internet and globalization have further eroded such limitations. The unitorrial
marks of the twenty-first century may not require international exhaustion in all
cases, but they certainly raise new issues about the potentiality of any such
exhaustion. Where no separate domestic goodwill exists for these marks, protecting
them against all unauthorized importations in all situations seems unnecessary to
say the least.
Finally, the unitorrial nature of trademarks demands a broadening of
enforcement options internationally.
Because such marks are no longer
automatically constrained by the territorial limits of use or registration, expanded
fora for the violation of rights in these marks seem mandated. Solutions to choice of
law, forum selection, jurisdiction and points of attachment (including the
"extraterritoriality" of laws) seeking to establish a single forum or single country
solution are premised on faulty conclusions about the nature of the rights to be
enforced.

63 To the contrary, it expressly left the decision regarding grey market protection to
individual member countries. See, e.g., id. art. 6 (excluding exhaustion of intellectual property
rights from dispute settlement).
61 Id. art. 16(3).
165 See .supra note 44 and accompanying text.
16 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The unitorrial nature of trademarks in the twenty-first century requires a
reevaluation of the nature of protection for global trademarks. Fame, dilution, grey
market and jurisdictional forum selection rules are just a few of the more significant
doctrines where present application of territoriality principles may no longer be
applicable in light of the evolved nature of trademarks in today's global marketplace.
Reliance on old rules of territoriality are no more reflective of the actual nature of
trademarks in today's global, digital marketplace, then the earlier doctrine of
universality. Until we appreciate the changing nature of trademarks, and conform
our practices to reflect their true nature, we risk stunting the benefits of global trade
offered by new global and digital markets. "Dogmatic territoriality"' 168 must give way
to unitorriality if the commercial and economic benefits of these new twenty-first
century markets are to be fully realized.

168 See, e.g., Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of InternationalTrademark Law, 2 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) ("[D]ogmatic territoriality when applied to intellectual property
ignores basic reality because informational products cannot be located at a particular spot on the
globe"); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Harmonization Norms, Names & Nonsense, 2 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 33, 33 (1998) (contending that harmonization of trademark laws will not happen
absent abandonment of territorial justifications of sovereignty).

